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The development of international rivers is often perceived as leading to confl icts or even water 
wars. However, as the development of the Mekong River shows, cooperation has not only 
prevailed in the last decades, but River Basin Organizations (RBOs), established to mitigate 
river-related confl icts and/or develop the river basin, have also contributed to the emergence of 
more general cooperation structures, mainly by creating spill-over eff ects in other issue-areas, 
bringing cooperation to policy ﬁ elds beyond the river itself. This article assesses the contribution 
of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) to the 
sustainable development of the Mekong Region as well as to the promotion of regional cooperation 
in mainland South-East Asia in general.
Keywords: Environmental Security, Shared Natural Resources, International Rivers, Mekong 
River Basin, River Basin Organizations
Die Entwicklung grenzüberschreitender Flüsse wird oft mit Konfl ikten oder gar Kriegen um 
Wasser assoziiert. Wie jedoch die Entwicklung im Mekong-Becken zeigt, waren die vergangenen 
Jahrzehnte nicht nur von Kooperation gezeichnet, sondern Flussbeckenorganisationen konnten 
außerdem dazu beitragen, weitreichendere Kooperationsstrukturen zu entwickeln, die sich auf 
andere Politikfelder ausdehnen. Dieser Artikel beschäftigt sich mit dem Beitrag der Mekong River 
Commission (MRC) und der Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung 
in der Mekong Region sowie zur Förderung allgemeiner regionaler Kooperation im Festländischen 
Südostasien.
Schlagworte: Umweltsicherheit, gemeinsame natürliche Ressourcen, internationale Flüsse, 
Mekong-Einzugsgebiet, Flussbeckenorganisationen 
1  Susanne Schmeier is a PhD Candidate at the Berlin Graduate School for Transnational Studies at the Hertie School of 
Governance (HSoG) in Berlin, Germany. Her research focuses on international environmental politics, transboundary 
natural resources and international rivers, particularly in South-East Asia. Contact: schmeier@transnationalstudies.
eu 
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1. Introduction
While the political map of the world is structured according to nation states, the 
Earth is composed of ecosystems, not necessarily matching with national bounda-
ries. This holds particularly true for international rivers. The use of a river by one 
riparian necessarily affects the opportunities of other riparians, creating externali-
ties or common pool resources situations leading to international collective action 
problems. Since international rivers provide 60 percent of the world’s freshwater 
flow and their basins cover 45 percent of the world’s surface, inhabiting 40 percent 
of its population (Wolf, 2004, p. 2), the emergence of opposing interests and strate-
gies is likely. Environmental security approaches (Homer-Dixon, 1991, Homer-Dixon, 
1994; Bächler, Böge, Klötzli, Libiszweski, & Spillmann, 1996; Gleditsch, 1998; Carius 
& Lietzmann, 1999) have emphasized the strong link between environmental degra-
dation and conflicts. They argue that increasing stress on natural resources and the 
environment is likely to lead to an intensification of collective action problems, pos-
sibly responded by vulnerable states through conflict or even war. Especially in the 
early 1990s, water was perceived as one of the resources the most prone to conflict, 
with various authors forecasting the emergence of water wars (Starr, 1991; Bulloch & 
Darwish, 1993; Frey, 1993; Gleick, 1996; Butts, 1997). Although most of the water war 
studies focus on the Middle East, the Mekong River Basin (MRB) has also often been 
referred to as a basin likely to experience major conflicts (Wolf, Yoffe, & Giordano, 
2003). 
However, reality in international basins has shown that collective action problems 
are more likely to serve as incentives for cooperation, particularly when riparian 
states realize that cooperation can generate benefits and lead to positive-sum-games: 
Out of the 1832 events coded by the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database 
(TFDD)2 for the second half of the twentieth century, 1228 have been cooperative. And 
out of the remaining 604 conflictive events, only 37 involved any form of violence, all 
of them below the threshold of war (Wolf, 1998; Wolf et.al., 2003). This also holds true 
for the Mekong River Basin, where cooperation on river-related issues has prevailed 
2  The TFDD Events Database coded every event on international rivers since the late 1940s. Additionally, the level of 
conflict or cooperation has been measured on the basis of so-called “Basins-at-Risk”-intensity values, ranging from 
-7 (highest level of conflict, i.e., war) to 7 (highest level of cooperation, i.e., voluntary merging of countries due to 
water) (see TFDD, n.d.; Wolf et.al., 2003).
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in the last decades. 
International institutions play an important role in turning water-related con-
flicts into cooperation, with the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and, although to 
a smaller extent, the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) being the most important 
ones in Mainland South-East Asia. Besides the direct contribution to the resolution 
of river-related conflicts, they advance regional cooperation in more general terms 
by creating spill-over effects in other issue-areas and extending cooperation beyond 
the river. Thereby, spill-over effects play a decisive role: Originally developed by neo-
functionalist theories of regional integration (Haas, 1980), the more general concept 
of spill-over describes the phenomenon that increased cooperation in one specific 
policy field leads to the emergence of more cooperation in other issue-areas as well. 
The creation of interdependencies and increased regional cooperation or even inte-
gration will then limit the opportunities for unilateral actions and the likelihood of 
conflict. 
The main question of this paper focuses on whether and to what extent river-
related collective action problems in the MRB are cooperatively managed through 
River Basin Organizations (RBOs) and, more importantly, whether and to what extent 
they have contributed to regional cooperation beyond the river, enhancing socioe-
conomic development and political stability. The paper is structured as follows: The 
first part introduces the different riparians’ interests in developing the MRB and the 
potentially arising conflicts; the following part focuses on existing institutionalized 
cooperation efforts, namely MRC and GMS. 
2. Conflict and Cooperation in the Mekong River Basin
Running through mainland South-East Asia for 4,900 km, the Mekong River is the 
region’s largest waterway, with a catchment area of more than 800,000 km2 in 
six riparian states (see Fig. 1). It can be divided into the Upper Mekong (mainly the 
Chinese river stretch and the Lao-Myanmar border stretch), and the Lower Mekong 
Basin between Laos and the river’s mouth. 
Hitherto, the river is largely undeveloped, particularly if compared to other large 
river basins in the world. Only since the 1990s, riparian states have increasingly reco-
gnized the Mekong as a great potential for their socioeconomic development (MRC, 
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2002, p. 7; Menniken, 
2006, p. 14): The river 
is the most important 
resource for irriga-
tion (with agricultu-
re accounting for 85 
percent of the entire 
river use) in a region 
largely depending on 
(irrigated) agricultu-
re for food produc-
tion and exports. It 
is essential for fis-
heries, significantly 
contributing to the 
daily protein needs 
of riparian commu-
nities and to riparian 
states’ exports (with 
an average contribu-
tion to the GDP of 5 percent). Moreover, fisheries and agriculture employ nearly 75 
percent of the population in the Lower Mekong Basin and contribute to growth, de-
velopment and the reduction of poverty. And the river is increasingly important for 
industrial and household purposes, particularly in fast industrializing and urbanizing 
riparian states such as China, Thailand and Vietnam. The generation of hydropower 
is another important use, providing electricity for the rapidly growing riparians. And 
the Mekong – although not entirely navigable – is an important transport route, es-
pecially in those riparian countries still lacking sufficiently developed railway or road 
networks. 
31
Fig. 1: Map “The Mekong Basin and its Riparian Countries”
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2.1. Riparian States’ Interests – Between River Development and Protection
2.1.1. China
China is the most upstream state and controls half of the river’s length. Its interests 
in exploiting the Mekong and its resources are all aimed at fostering the country’s 
socioeconomic development: First, the central government wishes to develop the 
Southwestern provinces Tibet and Yunnan, which has so far not experienced the same 
levels of economic growth as the East, by integrating their markets with their South-
East Asian neighbors. The Western Regional Development Plan (2000) emphasizes 
the importance of links between China and the other Mekong riparians, with the 
Mekong acting as a main transport axis. An ‘Agreement on Commercial Navigation 
on the Mekong-Lancang River’ has been signed with Myanmar, Thailand and Laos in 
2000, aiming at improving the navigability of the upper stretches of the river. The 
first passenger connection between Thailand and China was opened in June 2006 
by a Chinese company (“China to Thailand,” 2006). The first ships transporting oil 
to the Chinese port of Simao followed in December 2006 (“Sparks fly,” 2007). Since 
navigability is still restricted, the Chinese government is working with its neighbors 
on more projects, aiming at blasting more rapids and falls and creating a transport 
route on the entire length of the river. 
China furthermore has an ever-growing need for hydropower: The government 
aims at developing a cascade of at least eight dams, which are able to generate 
electricity for Yunnan’s future economic development and for electricity exports to 
Eastern Provinces and South-East Asian neighbors (especially Thailand and Vietnam). 
While the first dams were constructed in the 1980s (starting with the Manwan Dam 
in 1984, operational in 1993), hydropower activities increased enormously in recent 
years. In addition, China invests in other Mekong riparians’ hydropower facilities 
(particularly Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia). 
Due to its powerful upstream position, China’s salience and vulnerability to the 
river are relatively low. The country therefore has little interest in engaging in regio-
nal river basin management efforts, especially if the latter imply the establishment 
of binding principles – a policy the Chinese government opposes altogether. This 
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has become obvious when China was one of only three states rejecting the 1997 UN 
Convention on the Non-Navigational Use of Transboundary Watercourses. Still, Chi-
na has increased its engagement in Mekong-related cooperation in an informal and 
market-driven form. As such, China is increasingly involved in the GMS not only as 
a participant but also as a donor. China has become an important investor in other 
Mekong riparian countries, particularly in Laos, where it invests in the Nam Mang 
III Dam and is willing to provide financial guarantees for the Nam Theun II Project in 
case of the World Bank pulling out. 
Overall, the Chinese policy towards the other Mekong riparians is not focused 
solely on natural resources, but is embedded in a more general foreign policy strat-
egy, being more cooperative than a pure focus on the river and its resources might 
suggest. Therefore, the Chinese position towards downstream Mekong riparians can 
only be understood in the context of the country’s general foreign policy strategy 
and its increasing rapprochement towards its South-East Asian neighbors, namely 
in order to (re-)establish its regional hegemony and its economic relations (Hilpert 
et.al., 2005, pp. 31-35; Shambaugh, 2005; Möller, 2006). Since China opposes any form 
of binding rules that would restrict its river development, but has realized the be-
nefits of good relations with its neighboring countries and with river basin manage-
ment initiatives, the future balance of China’s resources needs and the importance it 
attributes to its relations with neighboring states will, therefore, be decisive for the 
Mekong’s future development.
2.1.2. Myanmar
The Mekong is only a border river for Myanmar with Laos for approximately 200 km. So 
far, the country has shown little interest in developing its stretch of the river and, in 
fact, lacks the capacity to undertake any major development projects. Nevertheless, 
the country’s large hydropower potential on the Mekong has received the interest of 
political leaders and external investors, particularly from China and Thailand. First 
efforts have been undertaken to develop Myanmar’s hydropower potential, mainly 
as a source of income for the internationally isolated military government. In 2002, 
the Department of Hydroelectric Power was established within the Ministry of 
Energy which has so far identified 268 potential sites for dams (Graecen & Palettu, 
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2007, p. 105). In 1997 and 2005, Myanmar signed Memorandums of Understanding 
with Thailand on the potential export of electricity. In the coming years, large-scale 
projects might be set up, which would affect both downstream riparians as well as 
the Myanmar population, namely since the government has been known for violently 
relocating local communities without any compensation. 
Being internationally isolated, Myanmar does not play an important role in re-
gional cooperation. However, the country depends on China’s development aid and 
economic cooperation (especially in the area of gems and timber exploitation). There-
fore, it has “approached the rank of a Sino satellite” (Stoett, 2005, p. 17) and is unlikely 
to oppose any Chinese development projects or to join further downstream states’ 
efforts in establishing regional mechanisms to restrict unilateral resource exploita-
tion. 
2.1.3. Laos
Laos is one of the least developed countries in the region and – with 95 percent 
of its territory in the Mekong basin – largely depends on the Mekong. Fishery and 
agriculture account for more than 52 percent of the country’s GDP, contribute more 
than 40 percent to its foreign currency income and provide employment opportunities 
for more than 85 percent of the population (Öjendal, 2000, p. 134; Molle, 2007, p. 13). 
The government therefore aims to develop so far non-existent irrigation schemes and 
using the river’s water for potentially increasing industrial and household demands. 
In addition, land-locked Laos relies on the Mekong as an axis of transport. 
Hydropower is by far the most important Mekong resource Laos is interested in. 
Electricity is one of the main export goods – particularly to Thailand, which already 
imports 2 percent of its total electricity from Laos and has signed new treaties gua-
ranteeing electricity supply at least until 2017 (Graecen & Palettu, 2007, p. 86). Accor-
ding to this strategy, the Lao government is engaged in further developing large-scale 
projects. To become the “battery of Southeast Asia”, existing hydropower facilities 
(the Nam Ngum, Xeset, Theun Hinboun, Hoay Ho and Nam Leuk Dams) will be com-
plemented by more dams, with at least 28 projects being planned until 2010, seven of 
them directly on the mainstream (Gajaseni, Heal, & Edwards-Jones, 2006, pp. 53-55; 
Herling, 2006, p. 23; Middleton, Garcia, & Foran, 2009, pp. 31-36). Along with increa-
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sing activity in the hydropower sector, new investors from Thailand, China, Russia, 
Vietnam and Malaysia push into Laos. For example, Chinese companies are current-
ly involved in two hydropower projects under construction, Vietnamese companies 
participate in feasibility studies on the Luang Prabang Dam and a Malaysian company 
signed an agreement for project development on the Don Sahong Dam. Since Laos 
fears dependency from Thailand, it welcomes new investors as yet another means to 
counter dependency besides the diversification of exports towards China and Viet-
nam.
Such projects are likely to create various adverse effects on more downstream 
Lao regions (which already suffer from the effects of Chinese dams) and on Cambo-
dia and Vietnam. This has also called the attention of NGOs (most recently against 
the Nam Theun II Project), with large protests leading as far as international donors 
reconsidering their engagement in the projects, which has traditionally been very 
high and has helped the country to justify its intensive river development projects 
regionally and internationally. 
Since Laos is characterized by an abundance of unexploited water resources and a 
large contribution to the river’s flow, it has a crucial position in the Mekong’s future 
development. Its position towards regional structures is ambiguous: While it is likely 
to be negatively affected by Chinese developments on the Mekong, it depends on its 
own hydropower projects for socioeconomic development and is therefore unlikely 
to join any efforts to regulate the river’s use in a more binding way. Laos acknow-
ledges the importance of regional cooperation mechanisms – particularly for their 
financial contribution to development projects and their role in increasing regional 
trade and development – but is neither completely willing nor capable to comply with 
their requirements. 
2.1.4. Thailand
Although one third of the country is situated in the MRB, the Mekong has – other 
than the Chao Praya – never played an important role in the country’s history. 
Only recently, the Mekong’s great potential for developing the country’s dry and 
underdeveloped Northeast and for guaranteeing water supply to Bangkok has been 
realized: Large irrigation projects in the Isaan Region and initiatives to transfer water 
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to Bangkok have been designed in the last years. Yet, political and economic turmoil 
has prevented implementation so far. Once political stability and economic growth 
will return to the country, there could be a renaissance of those plans, increasing 
conflict potential in the region. Furthermore, Thailand needs to ensure its growing 
demand for electricity (expected to double until 2021; Middleton et.al., 2009, p. 24). 
Since domestic hydropower opportunities have either been already exploited or 
massive protests from the civil society impede further developments, Thailand is 
interested in supporting the development of hydropower facilities in neighboring 
countries, especially in Laos and China. With both countries Memorandums of 
Understanding have been signed on electricity trade. 
Moreover, Thailand is interested in increasing its trade and investment ties with 
neighboring countries by using the Mekong as its “gate to Indochina”: In the search 
for new markets for Thai export products, new sources for natural resources, new 
opportunities for Thai border towns in the country’s Northern part and new invest-
ment opportunities for Thai companies, Thailand actively promotes further econo-
mic integration among riparians (Masviriyakul, 2004, pp. 308-310). This is mainly done 
through infrastructure development (i.e. funding of Mekong bridges and the impro-
vement of roads and ports) in neighboring countries. However, recent economic and 
political instabilities have slowed down Thai engagement. 
Economic integration, together with security cooperation, is, thus, the main in-
terest of Thailand, making issues beyond the river the most likely to push Thailand 
towards a more cooperative behavior. However, Thailand has little interest to further 
institutionalize regional cooperation, especially if they established more binding wa-
ter use principles or even veto rights for downstream countries. In this context, 
Thailand favors the integration of China into regional institutions, hoping to build 
coalitions against potential efforts of downstream countries to prevent large-scale 
development upstream.
2.1.5. Cambodia
With more than 85 percent of its territory in the Mekong Basin, Cambodia is one 
of the most vulnerable countries. The river and its resources are not only decisive 
for the living of riparian communities, but also provide development opportunities 
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for the entire country, which is still struggling with the consequences of war, the 
reestablishment of a democratic system, and a high dependence on external aid. 
Agriculture is the country’s main economic sector – accounting for more than 50% 
percent of its GDP and employing more than 90 percent of the population – with the 
Mekong and the Tonle Sap providing most of the water. As irrigation systems are 
largely missing or have been destroyed in years of conflict, the Cambodian government 
aims at developing new irrigation schemes in the next years. In addition, fishery is 
important for the food security of local communities as well as for exports. Moreover, 
the Mekong is an important transport route in a country with an insufficient road. 
In addition, the development of tourism – regarded as one of the main new sources 
of income – largely draws from the Mekong. Cambodia also aims to develop its own 
hydropower facilities, although its capacities are relatively limited and largely found 
on Mekong tributaries. While the most important project, the Sambor Falls Dam, 
financed by Thai, Malaysian and Chinese investors, has received much attention, 
most other projects are likely to focus on domestic supply only, thus being relatively 
small in scale (Graecen & Palettu, 2007, p. 110).
Overall, Cambodia’s dependence on the river explains its large interest in sustai-
nable river development, with regional cooperation structures being perceived as 
helpful. Moreover, the Cambodian government hopes to further integrate the coun-
try in regional cooperation structures which might foster the economic development 
or even provide financial and technical resources for development projects. Cambo-
dia fosters the establishment of more directly river-related cooperation initiatives 
within the MRC, for example by hosting the MRC Flood Management and Mitigation 
Program’s Regional Flood Centre and the MRC Fisheries Program. Still, Cambodia 
lacks the means and capacities to actively engage in the promotion of joint river ba-
sin management or to even push for more binding rules. 
2.1.6. Vietnam
As the most downstream riparian, Vietnam is extremely vulnerable to upstream river 
development activities. And although only 20 percent of the country lie within the 
Mekong Basin, it is of great importance for Vietnam’s overall development. While 
only 25 percent of the population lives in the Mekong Basin, the region produces 
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50 percent of all the country’s agricultural products, including 80 percent of the 
country’s rice crops and 90 percent of its rice exports, and contributes 50 percent to 
its seafood exports (Backer, 2007, p. 43). In order to do so, it is dependent on sufficient 
water flow from upstream to guarantee irrigation and to prevent salinity intrusion 
from the South China Sea. Additionally, severe floods have caused significant damage 
in recent years and are likely to worsen as a consequence of global climate change, 
requiring elaborated flood monitoring and management. 
Therefore, Vietnam has a high interest in regional river basin management, parti-
cularly through data exchange, joint flood protection and the establishment of bin-
ding rules on water quantity and quality. Additionally, Vietnam perceives regional 
cooperation initiatives as means of its regional foreign policy strategy, focusing on 
increased regional integration in political and economic terms. On the other hand, 
Vietnam also has an interest in developing further hydropower facilities (in addition 
to the already existing Drayling and Yali Dams on Mekong tributaries), especially to 
provide electricity to the economically growing region around Ho Chi Minh City. 
Since the country’s electricity demand will quadruple until 2015 (Middleton et. al., 
2009, p. 24), the Prime Minister announced in the National Strategy for Electricity in 
2004 (Vietnamese Prime Minister’s Decision 677/2004/QD-TTG; see Dan Sinh Nguyen 
Vo, 2008), that Vietnam will further increase its hydropower capacity from 39 per-
cent in 2006 to 62 percent in 2020. Therefore, another 17 projects are currently in the 
planning stage. Most of them are likely to affect Cambodia, which lies downstream 
to the Vietnamese Central Highlands. Along with other investors, the Asian Develop-
ment Bank (ADB) and the World Bank have made important contributions to those 
projects. Besides dams in the Central Highland, Vietnam also finances and builds 
projects in Laos and Cambodia which, besides the long-term supply of electricity, are 
also thought to increase the competitiveness of Vietnamese construction companies. 
Moreover, Vietnam buys electricity from Chinese Mekong hydropower plants, only 
being possible through the second Power Grid developed through the GMS (Hen-
sengerth, 2008, p. 117). However, in doing so, Vietnam indirectly supports projects it 
suffers from. 
The high dependence of most riparian states and the importance of the river and 
its resources for their socioeconomic development and, thus, for their overall na-
tional security has turned the Mekong into a central issue of regional politics – far 
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beyond river basin management. Hence, “the Mekong is an inescapable variable in 
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Source: Own Compilation
Table 1: Riparian interests
Main interests in 
river development
  
•	 Development of Yunnan Province 
(Western Regional Development 
Plan)
•	 Hydropower generation (cascade 
on mainstream and tributaries)
•	 Improvement of river navigability 
(navigation between Simao and 
Luang Prabang)
•	 Hydropower generation (sale to 
Thailand and China), but not yet 
developed
•	 Hydropower generation (for sale 
to Thailand, China and Vietnam)
•	 Integration into region (through 
infrastructure, growth triangles) 
with help of regional bodies
•	 Fishery/irrigation potential of 
Mekong decisive for population 
and development 
•	 Water diversion for irrigation/
agriculture, water supply in 
Bangkok
•	 Hydropower generation and 
purchase of electricity (from 
Laos)
•	 Avoiding major environmental 
degradation 
•	 Maintenance of water flow and 
water level in Tonle Sap Region 
guaranteeing fishery, agriculture, 
navigation, etc.
•	 Hydropower (with aim to export 
to Thailand and to substitute oil 
imports), but not yet developed
•	 Hydropower generation in Upper 
Highlands on Mekong tributaries
•	 Irrigation in Mekong Delta (inclu-
ding avoiding saltwater intrusion) 
and aquaculture
Country
China
 
Myanmar
Laos
Thailand
Cambodia
Vietnam
Strategic 
position 
on the river
Low salience/ 
upstream 
hegemon
Low salience/ 
weak/ low 
capacity
High salience/ 
low capacity
Limited salience/ 
midstream 
power
High salience/
low capacity
High salience/ 
downstream 
power
Foreign policy strategy towards 
the region/Mekong
  
Strategy of „peaceful development“, 
integration into regional 
cooperation networks for economic 
benefits (but no willingness 
to surrender to supra-national 
decisions), problematic relations to 
Vietnam, rather good relations to 
Thailand
International isolation under 
military government, no interest in 
integration into regional networks
Integration into regional 
cooperation network that provides 
major economic benefits (but still 
limited opening), traditionally good 
relations with Vietnam, strong 
relations to Cambodia, improving 
relations to China, conflictive 
relations with Thailand
Good relations with neighbors and 
strong ASEAN (but, foreign policy 
disrupted due to recent domestic 
political developments), favorable 
perception of China, tight relations 
to Myanmar, complicated relations 
with Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam
Integration into regional 
cooperation networks for 
the country‘s socioeconomic 
development/reconstruction after 
civil war; however, difficult relations 
to Vietnam and Thailand
Regional cooperation in economic 
terms/integration into ASEAN 
(balance Chinese influence), difficult 
relations with China (and Cambodia), 
strong relations with Laos, 
competition with Thailand over 
regional Lower Mekong hegemony
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the foreign policy planning of all Southeast Asian countries” (Stoett, 2005, p. 169). 
Existing and emerging collective action problems in the river basin are, therefore, 
often thought to lead to conflicts among riparian states. This will be elaborated in 
the following chapter. 
2.2. Conflict or Cooperation
As the previous sections have demonstrated, the MRB is characterized by a complex 
structure of interests and strategies. Therefore, international collective action 
problems are present, which – according to proponents of environmental security 
and water-war concepts – can lead to conflicts among riparian states. The specific 
upstream-downstream structure, with China as an upstream hegemon, tends to 
intensify existing problems, since upstream unilateral development projects are 
difficult to obviate. Moreover, the fact that competition for resources is not related 
to geophysical scarcity but rather to geopolitical and socioeconomic scarcities (that 
is, situations in which the opportunities of use of otherwise abundant resources 
by further downstream states are significantly reduced due to political power 
constellations and/or unequally distributed developments; Gleick, 1996, p. 6) tends to 
increase the conflict-conduciveness of river-related collective action problems.
The development of hydropower projects, one of the most contested issues in the 
basin, illustrates this perfectly: With a capacity of 200,000 million KW/year in the 
Lower Mekong Basin and 300,000 million KW/year in China (Dinar, Dinar, McCaffrey, 
& McKinney, 2007, p. 237), hydropower provides great development opportunities for 
the region. Especially upstream countries are interested in exploiting this potential 
for their development. On the other hand, the development of large hydropower 
projects has severe impacts on the river. As the Manwan and Dachaoshan Dams in 
China have already made clear, large dams can affect the river’s flow, reduce the 
availability of water for irrigation and the content of sediments, cause severe floods 
and droughts, and negatively impact on fish populations. Especially downstream sta-
tes are affected, potentially being restricted in their development opportunities and, 
hence, their national security perception. 
Moreover, other factors can further increase the likelihood of conflict in shared 
basins. Among them, economic asymmetries and problematic relations between ri-
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parian states in issues other than water have a particularly high likelihood of adding 
fuel to existing flames (Wolf, 2006, p. 25). Although all riparian states (with the ex-
ception of Myanmar) have experienced exceptionally high GDP growth rates in the 
last years, ranging from 4.8 percent in Thailand to 13 percent in China in 2007, their 
levels of development differ highly. Despite Thailand’s suffering from an economic 
downturn in the last decade, it is still the most advanced country with a GDP per 
capita of 3,400 USD in 2007 and a high level of human development. Cambodia and 
Laos, on the other hand, recently experienced high growth rates, but still lack basic 
human development. Vietnam managed to translate its high growth rates into a 
broader development and the reduction of poverty, nevertheless, far more has to be 
done. Similar findings hold true for Yunnan, which – despite the enormous growth 
rates of China – still struggles with various insufficiencies in terms of development, 
not least due to its relative marginalization in China (World Bank, 2009). Moreover, 
those countries compete on international markets, with economic competition out-
numbering complementarities among them. 
In addition, relations between the different riparian states are often problematic. 
Rooted in the 1000-year long Chinese occupation of Vietnam and ideological diffe-
rences related to the Sino-Soviet conflict in the 1960s and 1970s and the Chinese 
support to Cambodian Khmer Rouge during the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia 
1979 to 1989, Vietnam remains suspicious of any Chinese attempts to re-establish 
regional hegemony. Although all land border issues could be solved in 2008, disputed 
territories in the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea remain a major challenge. 
Still, China is increasingly interested in good relations to its South-East Asian neigh-
bors and has recognized Vietnam as a key player. Vietnam also has complicated rela-
tions to Cambodia, mainly due to the Vietnamese occupation and the increasing Viet-
namese influence in Cambodia. However, significant improvements could be made 
in recent years, particularly due to increased economic cooperation and a joint per-
ception of being the Mekong’s most downstream states. Vietnam and Thailand, being 
old rivals in the region and having experienced major conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s, 
mainly following the Vietnamese invasion in Cambodia and the Thai support to the 
Khmer Rouge, have different perceptions concerning the regional order in mainland 
South-East Asia, occasionally producing irritations in their relations (Hensengerth, 
2008). The very different positions on the Mekong’s development are likely to deterio-
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rate this problem, possibly leading to “the most intense rivalry” in the Mekong Basin 
(Dinar et. al., 2007, p. 239). Another major conflict line is found between Thailand 
and Laos. Following historic confrontations due to the Thai support to the US while 
Laos was following a Communist way, relations between the two countries today 
are characterized by unresolved border issues (despite the establishment of a border 
commission in 1997) that have led to occasional outbreaks of violence (with a short 
war erupting in the 1980s on border and refugee issues). Moreover, the increasing Lao 
economic dependence on Thailand has become an issue of conflict, particularly as 
Thailand largely benefits from the purchase of natural resources and electricity from 
Laos. Unresolved border issues also characterize the relations between Thailand and 
Cambodia, particularly in the Northwest of Cambodia where borders remain conte-
sted despite the establishment of a border commission in 2000. This led to occasional 
outbreaks of violence, particularly in the area of the Preah Vihear Temple, where 
gunfire was exchanged in 2008. Additionally, Thai business communities have been 
regularly accused to be involved in the (illegal) exploitation of natural resources and 
the promotion of gambling and sex labor in Cambodia. Relations imploded in 2003, 
when Cambodian demonstrators attacked the Thai embassy and Thai businesses in 
Phnom Penh. 
Despite those adverse circumstances cooperation prevailed in the last decades. 
Not only did the number of interactions among the Mekong’s riparian states increa-
se in general, but cooperative events also increased far more than conflictive ones, 
the latter only showing a very low level of conflict, usually in the form of verbally 
expressed disagreement (see Table 2). Thus, cooperation has clearly dominated the 
MRB. 
Similar to what general findings on water conflict and cooperation suggest (Wolf, 
1998; Wolf et. al., 2003), water has helped to provide incentives for cooperation even 
in times of hostile relations between riparian states (for example, cooperation on 
electricity export from Laos to Thailand prevailed despite ideological differences in 
the 1970s and 1980s). With institutional capacity in a river basin being a decisive va-
riable for turning water-related collective action problems into conflict or cooperati-
on (Wolf et. al., 2003, p. 43), regional organizations have played a decisive role. 
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3. Institutionalized Cooperation Efforts in the Mekong River Basin
As early as the 1950s, joint river basin management efforts developed in the MRB, 
particularly through initiatives of the US and UN Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East (UN-ECAFE). Although those two actors had different positions on how 
regional cooperation in mainland South-East Asia should look like – with the US being 
led by a functionalist logic of regionalism and the idea of pushing back communism, 
preferring a light and little institutionalized way, and UN-ECAFE opting for a more 
tightly knit and binding network – river basin management was seen as “one of the 
major means of accomplishing economic growth and social change” (Sewell & White, 
1966, p. 5). In line with general development concepts of the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Mekong Committee (MC), founded in 1957, had the task to “promote, coordinate, 
supervise and control the planning and investigation of water resources development 
projects” (Statute of the Committee). In its early years, the MC was very active in 
fulfilling those high expectations, undertaking several studies on the opportunities 
to exploit the Mekong in order to foster growth. The Indicative Basin Plan (1970) 
proposed a strategy for more development projects until the year 2000. However, 
cooperation soon fell to the vicissitudes of regional conflicts, with institutionalized 
cooperation practically ending when Cambodia withdrew from the MC in 1975. Until 
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Data provided by the TFDD Events Database.
Table 2: BAR-values Mekong
Timeframe BAR scale events in the Mekong Region Average BAR-
value
-7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1950-1959
1960-1969
1970-1979
1980-1989
1990-1999
2000-2008
All years
-6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-2
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
-1
0
0
0
0
2
12
14
0
0
1
0
0
3
1
5
1
0
1
0
4
17
30
52
2
3
1
0
0
28
2
34
3
5
1
0
4
11
4
25
4
3
20
0
4
12
8
47
5
0
1
1
0
0
0
2
6
1
1
0
0
2
0
4
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0,80
1,73
0,07
0,80
5,07
3,80
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the early 1990s, cooperation remained mainly bilateral, focused on low political 
issues and pragmatic projects only. Institutionalized cooperation did not come to a 
renaissance until the early 1990s, when MRC and GMS were founded. 
This development must also be seen in the context of a generally more cooperati-
ve regional environment, where other regional institutions, namely ASEAN and seve-
ral related initiatives such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), (re-)emerged as well. 
3.1. The Mekong River Commission – Intergovernmental River Basin Management
The MRC was established through the Agreement on the Cooperation for the 
Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, signed by Laos, Thailand, 
Cambodia and Vietnam in 1995. Negotiations on the agreement had been very difficult 
due to disagreements between Thailand and Vietnam on potential veto rights and on 
binding principles of water use. Only the active promotion of negotiations by the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) finally made an agreement possible 
(Browder, 2000; Menniken, 2006; Dinar et. al., 2007, p. 239). 
The MRC consists of a Council, responsible for policy decisions on the highest 
level, a Joint Committee, operationalizing the Council’s general strategy into specific 
projects, and the MRC Secretariat, providing technical and administrative services 
and implementing projects. Its task is 
to promote, support, cooperate and coordinate in the development of the full potential of sustainable 
benefits to all riparian States and the prevention of wasteful use of MRB waters, with emphasis and 
preference on joint and/or basin-wide development projects and basin programs through the formulation 
of a basin development plan (Mekong River Commission, 1995, chap. 3, art. 2). 
Therefore, its work focuses on eight key areas, namely irrigation and drought 
management, navigation, hydropower, flood management, fisheries, watershed 
management, environment and tourism. 
Despite its emphasis on key principles of water use, such as the equitable and 
reasonable use, the maintenance of flow in the dry season, and the exchange of 
information and data, the 1995 Agreement is less binding than previous rules; name-
ly the 1957 Agreement and the 1975 Joint Declaration of the MC contained explicit 
veto rights and the respective prior notification principles for riparian states against 
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unilateral projects. Even the adoption of an ‘Agreement on Data and Information 
Sharing’ in 2001 and the ‘Regulations on Prior Notification and Consultation’ as well 
as the ‘Agreement and the Regulations on Supervision of the Use of the Mekong 
River Water’ in 2003, providing guidelines on how to manage the river according 
to international river basin management principles, has not been able to establish 
truly binding rules for the river’s development. This is not least due to the fact that 
Thailand refused to sign them in 2004, arguing that they would be useless without 
Chinese participation anyway. In 2002, China and the MRC signed an agreement on 
technical cooperation, which became operational in 2004. It mainly deals with data 
sharing from two hydrological stations on the Upper Mekong, aiming at improving 
flood forecasting and flood protection for downstream states. So far, cooperation 
is taking place, albeit not satisfyingly. Data is only delivered in the dry season and 
China retains the right to restrict the data for strategic reasons, which, indeed, occa-
sionally happens. Moreover, information from two stations only is not sufficient for 
comprehensive flow monitoring. 
Similar to previous institutions in the region, funding largely comes from interna-
tional donors. UNDP’s contributions are of particular importance. Although impor-
tant for MRC’s capacity, the high dependence on donor funding negatively affects 
ownership at the institution. In 2008, contributions from member states were only 
USD 0.95 million, while donors contributed more than ten times as much (MRC, 2008, 
p. 2). Therefore, the MRC has introduced a “riparization policy” (MRC, 2006, p. 35), 
aiming at substituting donor funding for its core budget (that is, all costs except for 
project costs) by riparian’s resources until 2014. As until today, less than 10 percent 
of MRC’s budget is funded by its member countries, this target is far too optimistic.
Altogether, MRC’s contribution to sustainable river basin management and the 
promotion of regional cooperation, peace and security is ambiguous. It clearly has 
contributed to institutionalizing cooperation structures in mainland South-East Asia, 
particularly by providing a forum of negotiation for river-related collective action pro-
blems and by engaging in various cooperation projects, ranging from the promotion 
of infrastructure development to the protection of transboundary natural resources 
and the environment. On the other hand, it “cannot be claimed to have a decisive 
impact on the members’ management of the basin’s natural resources” (Backer, 2007, 
p. 44). Besides the lack of institutional capacity of the MRC, this is due to the fact that 
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elites in member states still lack the acknowledgement of the importance of Mekong 
cooperation in general (Will, 2009, p. 39). Since the implementation of policy recom-
mendations from the MRC rests with member states and is not binding, copious 
achievements have been rare so far. Moreover, many “riparian member states prefer 
the MRC to be a rather toothless organization that identifies development projects 
and attracts external funds, whilst control of the development remains with the 
states themselves” (Backer, 2006, p. 38). As long as member states “continue to lack 
the will to commit to a strict regime with specified procedures to establish a flow re-
gime” (Backer, 2007, p. 45), the MRC is unlikely to contribute to the establishment of 
binding principles and rules that will guarantee the river’s sustainable development. 
Moreover, the non-participation of China in the MRC further decreases its capacities. 
Although China increasingly cooperates on minor issues (such as data sharing, or 
navigation), it remains unwilling to commit to more than its observer status. 
Nevertheless, the MRC has made important contributions not only to water-rela-
ted cooperation and the sustainable management of the Mekong, but also to confi-
dence building and intensified cooperation among riparians in issue-areas other than 
water management.
3.2. The Greater Mekong Sub-Region – Economic Integration beyond the River
The GMS was established among all Mekong riparian states in 1992 at the Conference 
of Mekong Riparian States initiated by the ADB. From the very beginning on, the GMS 
was understood as a loosely connected group of countries linked to each other by 
the Mekong. Similar to the concept of sub-regional growth triangles (Masiriyakul, 
2004; Kongkraew, 2004; Dosch & Hensengerth, 2005), geographic links are thought to 
make economic integration beneficial for all states and to foster further integration. 
While the MRC focuses on the sustainable development of the river, emphasizing the 
river as the key variable of cooperation, the GMS’ approach centers around economic 
development and market-driven exploitation of natural resources, particularly 
through infrastructure development. 
According to its wide and market-led concept, the GMS is organized in a loose 
institutional structure, consisting of the Meeting of Prime Ministers (every three 
years), yearly Ministerial Conferences and Working Groups (in addition, National Co-
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ordination Committees manage cooperation projects within the member states). The 
ADB itself holds an important position within the GMS framework. It is the single 
most important actor in GMS cooperation, providing not only funding, administrati-
ve and technical support, but also functioning as the GMS Secretariat.
In line with its integration-centered approach, GMS focuses on the promotion of 
trade liberalization and FDIs, the removal of trade barriers, and the development of 
physical links between the participating states, led by the idea of “enhancing com-
petitiveness through connectivity” (GMS, 2007). The Vientiane Action Plan 2008-2012 
(GMS, 2008) identifies nine key sectors (transport, energy, telecommunication, agri-
culture, environment, tourism, human resources development, trade, investment). 
The Economic Corridors, linking China, Thailand and Vietnam (North-South Corri-
dor), Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam (East-West Corridor) and Thailand, Cam-
bodia and Vietnam (Southern Corridor) are of particular importance, since the deve-
lopment of physical links is regarded as one of the most important prerequisites for 
economic integration. 
In recent years, especially since the 10th GMS Summit in Phnom Penh 2002, which 
reemphasized GMS’ commitment to fostering regional cooperation and proposed the 
Greater Mekong Subregion Strategic Framework 2002-2012, the GMS has expanded in 
its projects, covering more issue-areas (such as energy, biodiversity, health, transna-
tional crime, flood and drought management, and human resources development). 
GMS is increasingly turning towards non-traditional security threats in the region, 
acknowledging that they can have severe negative effects on the socioeconomic de-
velopment of Mekong riparians.
Overall, “the wide range of cooperation efforts as part of the GMS and related 
intergovernmental activities has had an impact on fostering subregional peace and 
stability” (Dosch, 2007, p. 134). GMS projects can be perceived as “multi-dimensional 
confidence-building measures” (Dosch & Hensengerth, 2005, p. 272). Particularly the 
integration of China into Mekong-related cooperation and the high relevance China 
attaches to the GMS, the GMS thus being „a core element of Beijing’s policy outlook“ 
(Dosch & Vuving, 2008, p. 15), has allowed to establish a basin-wide cooperation 
structure. On the other hand, the GMS could not (yet) achieve all its goals and even 
in its core focus area, the promotion of regional economic integration, results re-
main small. For example, trade between the Chinese province of Yunnan and other 
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GMS states has decreased despite major infrastructure and trade promotion pro-
jects, while trade between Yunnan and non-GMS states significantly increased in 
the 1990s (Poncet, 2006). Especially less developed countries such as Cambodia and 
Laos do not benefit from economic integration as much as they expected. Moreover, 
the GMS deals with a large number of planning and implementation problems: The 
development of joint projects only requires the participation of at least two states, 
with other countries not even being asked for their approval – a practice likely to 
worsen collective action problems related to river-basin development, particularly in 
the hydropower sector, instead of enhancing security in the region. However, GMS’ 
contribution to a more cooperative environment in mainland South-East Asia – and 
particularly its potential to improve this further – should not be neglected.
4. Conclusion
Overall, conflict and cooperation in the MRB revolves around three different, yet 
interdependent issues: the exploitation of natural resources, the protection of the 
river basin, and the promotion of economic integration. 
The main contribution of institutionalized cooperation efforts in the Mekong Re-
gion has been the creation of a stable and peaceful environment in which collective 
action problems related to the river can be peacefully mitigated. The establishment 
of cooperative projects on the river and beyond – ranging from joint flood protection 
mechanisms to the active promotion of cross-border trade and investments – has 
led to growing interdependence among riparian states. As TFDD Events data shows, 
conflictive actions have decreased compared to cooperative ones and average BAR-
values did significantly increase in the 1990s in the context of the establishment 
of institutions (see Table 2). Institutionalized mechanisms have made an important 
contribution to mitigating conflicts, even in the context of otherwise complicated 
relations between riparian states. Furthermore, water-related issues have helped to 
generate cooperation in issue-areas beyond the river as well, starting with infra-
structure developments and environmental protection, increasingly spilling over to 
economic and even political cooperation.
Although significantly contributing to regional security, neither MRC nor GMS can 
(yet) be perceived as a security community in the proper sense of the term, since 
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unresolved conflicts persist in the region and existing cooperation remains at a low 
level and riparian states are not integrated in a tightly knit net of security-related 
interdependencies. MRC’s and GMS’ contribution to the establishment of regionali-
zation building blocks can, however, be perceived as important contributions to an 
improvement of regional security in the Mekong River Basin, even beyond the issue-
area of river basin management. Generally speaking, it can be summarized that MRC 
and GMS did, indeed, contribute to a large extent to the resolution of water-related 
conflicts and the promotion of regional cooperation beyond the Mekong River itself, 
thus contributing to the overall security in mainland South-East Asia. However, seve-
ral improvements need to be achieved to not only enhance regional cooperation and 
generate cooperation benefits, but to also make cooperation more effective – thus 
establishing a resilient framework of cooperation that is able to sustainably enhance 
the overall security in the region both for riparian states as well as for riparian com-
munities.
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